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The Assignment of Choses in Action
By L. L. Briggs

Assignments of accounts receivable have increased in volume
and number to such an extent that accountants have become
interested in the legal aspects of such transfers. The court
decisions dealing specifically with such assignments are few,
but the subject is fully covered by the common law on assign
ments of “choses in action,” a rather broad legal term which
includes accounts receivable. Consequently, the statements in
this paper that concern choses in action apply to accounts
receivable.
By the rules of the early common law, choses in action were not
assignable because it was thought to be impossible to transfer
property which was not in possession. It was soon found that a
rigid adherence to this principle was inconvenient in practice and
detrimental to the interests of business, so various methods of
getting around it were devised. The first method of evading the
rule was by an appeal to the courts of equity, which were liberal
in the recognition of new forms of property and had decided at an
early date that choses in action were assignable. Stimulated by
this liberality, the common-law courts began to search for some
way by which they could follow the doctrine of “stare
decisis” and permit chose-in-action assignments. Gradually
they developed the device of giving power of attorney to
the assignee to collect the claim from the debtor and to
keep the proceeds under the theory that the assignee acted as
the agent of the assignor. The next step has been taken in
some states by the enactment of statutes which permit the
assignee to sue in his own name if this is necessary in order
to collect the debt and make all assignments formerly recognized
only in equity equally valid in law (Hooker v. Eagle Bank (1864)
30 N. Y. 83).
In most jurisdictions the courts agree that accounts receivable
based upon goods sold and delivered are assignable in equity
(Dix v. Cobb (1808) 4 Mass. 508). Both liquidated and un
liquidated book accounts are included (Crocker v. Whitney (1813)
10 Mass. 316). According to Justice Hoke in Atlantic and North
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Carolina Railroad Company v. Atlantic and Northern Company
(1908) 147 N. C. 368:

. . . now it may be stated as a general rule that ... all
ordinary business contracts are assignable. . . . The follow
ing criterion is universally adopted: All things in action
which survive and pass to the personal representatives of a
decedent creditor as assets . . . are in general assign
able. . . .

However, there are some circumstances in which accounts re
ceivable are not assignable. In conformity with the general prin
ciple that the intent of the parties controls in a contract, if the
terms of the original contract provide that it shall not be assigned,
such terms will govern. Justice Hand, in Mueller v. Northwestern
University (1902) 195 Ill. 236, said:
The rule is laid down . . . that the parties to a contract
may in terms prohibit its assignment, so that an assignee
can not succeed to any rights in the contract by virtue of the
assignment to him and the rule thus announced is well sup
ported by authorities.

Where there are mutual accounts, a particular item of credit in
one of them may not be assigned before a balance is struck
(Nonantum Worsted Company v. Webb, 124 Pa. St. 125). The
court, in Whittle v. Skinner (1851) 23 Vt. 531, decided that an un
liquidated partnership balance was not assignable.
The equity courts of some states permit the assignment of fu
ture accounts receivable, and when the accounts come into exist
ence the situation is the same as in the case of an assignment of
existing accounts. The effect of such an assignment is to give
the assignee power of attorney to collect the accounts when they
come into being. Since one may give power of attorney to collect
a debt which is to come into existence tomorrow as readily as to
collect one already in existence, there is no reason why the courts
of equity should treat an assignment of future accounts as differ
ing from an assignment of present accounts.
That the assignment of a debt not due is valid if there is an
existing contract out of which the debt may arise was held by the
court in Monarch Discount Company v. Chesapeake and Ohio
Railway Company (1918) 285 Ill. 233. It was decided in Tailby
v. The Official Recorder, 13 A. C. 523, that unearned book accounts
are assignable although they are to be earned thereafter by the
assignor in another business. It is generally necessary to specify
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the transactions whereby the future accounts are to arise (Sperry
v. Clarke, 76 Iowa 503). In Davis v. Pitcher, 97 Iowa 13, it was
held to be sufficient to describe the accounts to accrue from the
sale of certain merchandise. But, if the accounts are to arise from
contracts not yet made, the assignment of such accounts is gener
ally held invalid as against creditors of the assignor (Raulins v.
Levi (1919) 232 Mass. 42). Where there is no existing contract
from which the claim is expected to arise, the right to assign a
future account has been denied by the courts of Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. In Skipper v. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255,
the court decided that accounts to be earned in the future by the
practice of medicine were not assignable although there was an
earlier decision in the same state to the contrary effect.
In the absence of a statute prescribing the form of assignment
or a contract provision between the parties as to the manner of
assignment, no particular form of words is necessary to effect a
valid assignment of a chose in action. According to Justice Beck
in Moore v. Lowrey, 25 Iowa 336:

No particular form is necessary to constitute an assignment
of a debt. If the intent of the parties to effect an assignment
be clearly established, that is sufficient.
Anything which shows an intention to assign on the one side, and
from which an assent to receive may be inferred on the other, will
operate as an assignment, if sustained by a sufficient consideration.
The original parties to the contract may make any agreement
they may desire as to the mode of making assignments and
such agreements will govern. If there is more than one assignee
the one to whom the chose in action is assigned according to the
terms of the contract will prevail over one to whom the claim was
not so assigned (Fortunato v. Patten (1895) 147 N. Y. 277).
Choses in action may be assigned by parol in most jurisdic
tions. According to Chief Justice Mansfield in Heath v. Hall
(1812) 4 Taunton 326:

If two men agree for the sale of a debt and one of them gives
the other credit in his books for the price, that may be a very
good assignment in equity; its resting in parol is no objection.
In Union Trust Company v. Bulkeley (1907) 150 Fed. 510, the
court maintained that an assignment of a chose in action by parol
as security was valid. Oral assignments of book accounts have
been upheld by the courts of Mississippi and Vermont.
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It has been ruled in Williams v. Ingersoll, 87 N. Y. 508, and by
the courts of nearly every jurisdiction that assignments need not
be in writing. However, the statutes of a few states make only
assignments in writing valid at law (Planters' Bank v. Prater, 64
Ga. 609). In Iowa it was decided in an early case that assign
ments of book accounts must be in writing in order to authorize
the assignee to sue on the instrument in his own name (Andrews
v. Brown, 1 Iowa 154) but Wisconsin has a contrary rule (Wooliscroft v. Norton (1862) 15 Wis. 198). Where the statutes authorize
assignments of choses in action, when applied to written instru
ments, it has been held to mean written assignments, according to
the court in Miller v. Paulsell, 8 Mo. 355. Written assignments
may be under seal (Everit v. Strong (1844) 7 Hill 585).
Assignments of accounts receivable may be inferred from the
conduct of the parties {Coates v. Emporia First National Bank
(1882) 91 N. Y. 20). That mere delivery of written evidence of
the debt may be sufficient was ruled in Jones v. Witter (1816) 13
Mass. 304, and the giving of power of attorney to collect a debt
may be considered an equitable assignment thereof, if the parties
so intend {People v. Tioga Common Pleas (1838) 19 Wend. (N. Y.)
73). In Ryan v. Maddux, 6 Cal. 247, the court maintained that
an account could be assigned by the owner writing the word “as
signed” above his signature.
There must be some sort of a delivery in order that an assign
ment of a chose in action take effect {White v. Kilgore, 77 Me.
571) but it need not be an actual delivery in order to pass the bene
ficial interest to the assignee. It may be constructive, according
to the court in Spring v. South Carolina Insurance Company
(1823) 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 268. Any act of the assignor indicating
that he relinquishes to the assignee the control over the chose in
action will amount to constructive delivery thereof {Richardson v.
White (1896) 167 Mass. 58). If the assignment is written, the
delivery of the writing is all that is necessary {Tatum v. Ballard,
94 Va. 370). The delivery of a copy of a book account was held
a sufficient delivery in Akin v. Meeker (1894) 78 Hun (N. Y.) 387
but the court in Cornwell v. Baldwin's Creek 43 N. Y. Supp. 771,
gave a contrary decision. That constructive delivery of the chose
in action is valid even as against creditors was held in Fisher v.
Bradford, 7 Me. 28.
There is much confusion in the early English cases as to the
necessity for consideration in chose assignments. It seems quite
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probable that originally consideration was not essential, but that
later there was a change of view on the part of the courts. At the
present time an English court of equity will not assist an assignee
of a chose in action unless the assignment was made upon valid
consideration (Edwards v. Jones, 1 Myl. & Cr. 226). In the United
States the rule is that the assignee is permitted to sue in his own
name in the case of an absolute assignment of accounts receivable
even though there was no consideration (Stone v. Frost, 61 N. Y.
614). The same principle was upheld by the court in Young v.
Hudson, 99 Mo. 102. If an assignment of a chose in action is
made as collateral it has been held that there must be adequate
consideration to render the assignment valid against creditors
of the assignor {Langley v. Berry, 14 N. H. 82). The assignment
of a chose in action imposes on the debtor an equitable and moral
obligation to pay the assignee, which is a good consideration for an
express promise on the part of the debtor to pay the assignee and
will authorize a suit in the name of the latter. This was the de
cision of the court in Burrows v. Glover (1871)106 Mass. 324, and
in several other cases. If the assignment has been made without
consideration, the payment by the debtor to the assignor has been
held a good defense to a suit by the assignee {Dunning v. Sayward, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 366).
Except with regard to a few special classes of choses in action,
such as future earnings which several states require to be recorded
for the protection of the assignee, assignments of choses in action
are not included by the recording statutes, and such assignments
are valid without filing and recording in any office of public record
(Aultman v. McConnell (1888) 34 Fed. 274). Statutes in many
states make a mortgage effective against creditors if it is recorded,
but such acts have generally been held not to apply to choses
in action {Young v. Upson (1902) 115 Mass. 192). According to
the supreme court of the United States in Benedict v. Ratner
(1925) 268 U. S. 353:
The statutes which embody the doctrine and provide for re
cording as a substitute for delivery do not include accounts.
The assignment of a chose in action conveys, as between as
signor and assignee, the right which the assignor then possesses
to that thing and the law will assist the assignee to assert that just
and proper claim. All remedies open to the assignor for the en
forcement of the obligation are open to the assignee (Crippen v.
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Jacobson, 56 Mich. 386). Justice Treat stated the attitude of the
courts in Chapman v. Shattuck (1846) 8 Ill. 49, where he said:
The doctrine is now well settled that courts of law will recog
nize and protect the rights of the assignees of a chose in action,
whether the assignment be good at law or in equity only.

Centuries ago the rule became established in England that when
the owner of a claim made an assignment of it, he thereby gave
the assignee the power to enforce it in his stead, and this power
was irrevocable. At common law the assignee did not have a
legal right which he could enforce in his own name, but merely
an equitable interest to secure which he was given the right to
use the name of the assignor (Usher v. D’Wolfe (1816) 13 Mass.
290). According to Justice Field in James v. Newton (1886) 142
Mass. 366:
According to the modern decisions, courts of law recognize the
assignment of a chose in action, so far as to vest an equitable
interest in the assignee, and authorize him to bring an action
in the name of the assignor, and recover a judgment for his
own benefit.

This is the rule in most of our states. Louisiana is an exception.
In that state no distinction is made between the legal and the
equitable title, and the assignee of an open account may sue in
his own name (Kilgour v. Ratcliff, 2 Mart. N. S. (La.) 252).
In order to entitle the assignee to bring the action in his name,
the federal courts and those of Georgia, Iowa, Maryland and Mis
sissippi require that the assignment be in writing. Where the
legal title is transferred to the assignee, the assignor can not sue,
so the assignee is the only party who can collect from the debtor
(Beck v. Rosser, 68 Miss. 72). That the assignee of an obligation
to pay money must sue in his own name was decided by the court
in Carhart v. Miller, 5 N. J. L. 675.
In some jurisdictions the statutes provide that actions must be
brought by the real parties in interest, with the result that often
the assignee can not sue at law in the name of the assignor but must
proceed in his own name on the chose. If the assignee holds the
chose for the benefit of another or under an agreement is bound
to account to another for the proceeds, he is regarded, in several
states, as the trustee of an express trust, and he may sue in his
own name without joining his beneficiary (Murphin v. Scovell, 44
Minn. 530). Where claims were assigned to an attorney for col
lection and application of the proceeds to the payment of debts
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of the assignor in the attorney’s hands, the court, in Wynne v.
Heck, 92 N. C. 414, decided that the assignee was the real party
in interest and could sue alone. However, according to the de
cision given in Pleasants v. Erskine, 82 Ala. 386, if the assignee is
to account for the proceeds of an assigned chose in action he is
not the real party in interest and can not sue in his own name.
If the debtor makes an express promise to the assignee to pay
him the debt, the assignee then has the right to sue in his own
name. The reason underlying this rule was stated by Justice
Field in James v. Newton (1886) 142 Mass. 366:

The law that, if the debtor assents to the assignment in such
a manner as to imply a promise to the assignee to pay him the
sum assigned, then the assignee can maintain an action, rests
upon the theory that the assignment has transferred the prop
erty in the sum assigned to the assignee as the consideration of
the debtor’s promise to pay the assignee, and that by this prom
ise the indebtedness to the assignor is pro tanto discharged.

An assignment made as collateral security for a debt transfers
only a qualified interest in the assigned chose and this is true al
though the assignment on its face is absolute (Jarboe v. Templer,
38 Fed. 213). To the extent of his interest, the assignee is the
owner of the collateral as against the assignor and he may sue
thereon {Sullivan v. Sweeney (1872) 111 Mass. 366). If he ob
tains the legal title he may recover the full amount of the chose
in action from the debtor notwithstanding the fact that he holds
the chose as security for a debt (Ginochio v. Amador Canal, 67
Cal. 493). However, in Cerf v. Ashley, 68 Cal. 419, the court
maintained that where a chose in action is assigned as collateral
security, the assignor must join the assignee in an action against
the debtor because the assignor is one of the parties in interest.
The English courts do not permit the assignee of a chose in action
to sue in his own name where the assignment is for the purpose of
security (Durham v. Robertson (1898) 1 Q. B. 765). After the
debt for which the collateral was given is paid, the right to hold
the collateral ceases, and the assignee has no interest in it that he
can transfer to another. If there is a balance after the debt has
been paid from the assigned security, the assignee is liable to the
assignor for that amount.
If the assignor becomes insolvent after the assignment and
bankruptcy proceedings are begun, the assignee may still use the
assignor’s name in suing the debtor and the bankruptcy will be no
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defense (Matherson v. Wilkinson (1851) 79 Me. 159). In Lyford
v. Dunn (1856) 32 N. H. 81, the court held that the assignee is a
creditor within the meaning of the insolvency act requiring notice
to creditors.
Among the rights possessed by the assignee of a chose in action
is that of transferring the chose to a second assignee {Dawes v.
Boylston (1812) 9 Mass. 337). The latter would take it subject to
all equities between the original parties. Or an assignee may re
assign the chose to the original assignor and the latter may main
tain an action against the debtor in his own name in spite of a
promise of the debtor to pay the first assignee if the debtor has
not been notified of the reassignment (Clark v. Parker (1849) 4
Cush. 361). The assignment of a chose gives to the assignee the
right to control the court proceedings and to dismiss the suit
(Southwick v. Hopkins (1860) 47 Me. 362). A court of equity will
restrain the assignor from interfering with an action brought by
the assignee in the assignor’s name {Deaver v. Eller, 42 N. C. 24)
and the assignee can hold the assignor who collects the debt in a
common-law action for money had and received {Camp v. Tomp
kins (1833) 9 Conn. 545). In some circumstances the assignee
may acquire a higher right against the debtor than the assignor
had before the assignment. For example, the debtor may act in
such a manner that his conduct will estop him from asserting
against the assignee his equities against the assignor. If the
debtor promises the assignee before the assignment has been made
that he will pay the full amount of the claim, equities between the
assignor and the debtor with respect to the assigned chose in
action will not affect the assignee. This principle is laid down in
numerous decisions.
The assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to all equities
existing between the debtor and the assignor at the time of the
assignment (Schenuit Rubber Company v. International Finance
Corporation (Md. 1925) 130 Atl. 331). The assignment vests in
the assignee the same title possessed by the assignor and no more.
According to Lord Chancellor St. Leonards in Mangles v. Dixon
(1852) 18 Eng. L. & Eq., 82:
... if a man does take an assignment of a chose in action, he
must take his chance as to the exact position in which the
party giving it stands. . . . Whatever may be the state of
the account . . . the man who takes an assignment . . .
must take it just as he finds it . . .
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According to Justice Story, in Greene v. Darling, 5 Mason (U. S.)
201, this principle applies only to the specific chose in action which
is assigned and not to other equities subsisting between the parties
as to other debts or transactions.
Although the assignee takes the chose subject to the valid liens
of the debtor against it at the time of the assignment (First Ward
National Bank v. Thomas, 125 Mass. 278) he does not take it sub
ject to equities of third persons of which he had no notice
(Himrod v. Bolton, 44 Ill. App. 516). The principle and the
reason for it have been well expressed by Chancellor Kent, in
Murray v. Lylburn (1817) 2 Johns. Ch. 441, where this great
jurist said:
It is a general and well-settled principle, that the assignee of a
chose in action takes it subject to the same equity it was sub
ject to in the hands of the assignor. But this rule is generally
understood to mean the equity residing in the original obligor
or debtor, and not an equity residing in some third person
against the assignor. The assignee can always go to the
debtor, and ascertain what claims he may have against the
. . . chose in action, which he is about purchasing from the
obligee; but he may not be able, with the utmost diligence,
to ascertain the latent equity of some third person against
the obligee.
Vermont, apparently, does not follow the general rule, for in
Downer v. South Royalton Bank (1867) 39 Vt. 25, the court
decided that the assignee took the chose in action subject to
claims in favor of a third person although no notice had been
given.
If the assignee suspects equities between the assignor and the
debtor and mistrusts deception on the part of the former, it is his
duty to inquire of the debtor as to his claims against the assignor
when notice is given of the assignment. If he fails to make in
quiry and pays more for the assignment than its value, due to the
hidden equities of the debtor against the assignor, he must stand
the loss. If proper inquiry is made the debtor is bound to inform
the assignee of the real circumstances and if he fails to give the
information he will not be permitted to take advantage of the
equities existing between him and the assignor. The debtor has
the same obligation of disclosure if the notice on its face shows the
deception of the assignee. But if there is no notice of fraud and
nothing to lead the debtor to think that the assignee is likely to
sustain a loss, it is usually considered that the former is under no
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obligation to volunteer information. In Mangles v. Dixon (1852)
18 Eng. L. & Eq. 82, Lord Chancellor St. Leonards said:

I conceive that equity will not require the party who receives
the notice, impertinently almost, to interfere between two
parties who have dealt behind his back, and who have never
made any communication to him or even seen him, on that
subject.
The debtor may subject the chose in action in the hands of the
assignee to all equities against the assignor and all defenses he had
against the assignor prior to the time he receives notice of the
assignment {Littlefield v. Albany County Bank, 97 N. Y. 581).
This is true although the assignee is ignorant of such defenses
{Wood v. Perry (1847) 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 114) and he has not had
notice of the equities. In order to protect his interests the as
signee should notify the debtor of the assignment as soon as possi
ble. After the notification neither the assignor nor the debtor can
divest the assignee of his rights in the chose in action {Brice v.
Bannister, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 569). The debtor can set up no
defense which accrued to him after notice of the assignment
{Upton v. Moore (1872) 44 Vt. 552). But he may take advantage
of any equities between him and the assignor prior to notice of the
assignment for the reason that equities after the assignment but
before the notice are usually founded upon a continued course of
dealing between the debtor and the assignor, and the debtor has
reason to believe that the course of dealing has not been affected
by the assignment until he has notice of that transfer. But after
receiving the notice, neither payment by him to the assignor nor a
release by the latter will affect the rights of the assignee against
the debtor {Jones v. Witter (1816) 13 Mass. 304). The decision
given in the case of Thorn v. Myers, 5 Strobh. (S. C.) 210, is an
outstanding exception to the general rule. The court ruled that
where the assignment passed the legal title in the chose to the
assignee the debtor could not set up equities acquired against the
assignor after assignment but prior to notice thereof.
The debtor has the right of set-off in respect to any equities be
tween him and the assignor and also between him and the assignee
prior to notice of the assignment {Hackett v. Martin (1831) 8
Green 77). But he may not set-off a claim held by him at the
time of the assignment if he had notice from the assignee that the
assignment was about to be made and did not disclose such claim
{King v. Fowler (1820) 16 Mass. 397). Neither may the debtor
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set-off any claim accruing or procured subsequent to the notice
{Bartlett v. Pearson, 29 Me. 9). Furthermore, the chose in the
hands of the assignee is not subject to set-off by the debtor if the
obligation is not mature at the date of the notice {Breen v. Seward,
11 Gray (Mass.) 118). A promise on the part of the debtor to the
assignee to pay him the full amount of the assigned chose in action
has been held to be a waiver of all right of set-off against the
assignor, existing at the time or arising at a later date {King v. Fowler
(1820) 16 Mass. 397).
For the purpose of protecting his claim to the assigned chose in
action, the assignee should give immediate notice of the assign
ment to the debtor. According to Justice Dodge, in Skobis v.
Ferge, 102 Wis. 122:
. . . The authorities are overwhelming, and almost without
dissent, that no assignment of a chose in action can have any
effect upon the debtor or fundholder, or interfere with his
dealings with the fund until brought to his notice.
As between the assignee and the debtor the assignment does not
become operative until the time of notice to the latter and until
such notice is received. The debtor still remains a debtor to the
assignor and may pay him the obligation. Justice Willes, in L.
R. 5 C. P. 594, maintained that it is:
A rule of general jurisprudence that if a person enters into a
contract, and, without notice of any assignment, fulfills it to
the person with whom he made the contract, he is discharged
from the obligation.

But, as between the assignor and the assignee, it is not necessary
to the validity of the assignment that the debtor be notified {Allyn
v. Allyn (1891) 154 Mass. 570).
Until the debtor receives notice of the assignment he may deal
with the assignor as if the assignment had not been made and he
will be protected as to all bona-fide defenses arising before he
had knowledge of the assignment {Campbell v. Day (1844) Vt.
558) and the same evidence that would be admissible between the
original parties is admissible against the assignee {Loomis v.
Loomis (1854) 26 Vt. 198). He may safely pay the assignor
(Ashcomb's Case (1674) 1 Ch. Cas. 232) or the assignor may re
lease him from the obligation. Creditors of the assignor may
attach the fund at any time before the debtor has notice {Wood
bridge v. Perkins (1809) 3 Day (Conn.) 364). If a judgment is
entered against the debtor garnishee prior to notice, the creditor
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will be entitled to preference over the assignee (Wood v. Partridge
(1814) 11 Mass. 488). It is worthy of notice that the court, in
McDonald v. Kneeland, 5 Minn. 352, made a contrary decision in
regard to this point. It has been said that notice to the debtor
plays a part in the assignment of a chose in action similar to that
which recording the deed does in a grant of land.
After the debtor has knowledge of the assignment the chose
becomes fixed in his hands and he is inhibited from doing anything
which may prejudice the rights of the assignee. Payment by him
to the nominal creditor will be no defense to an action brought for
the benefit of the assignee (Littlefield v. Storey (1808) 3 Johns.
(N. Y.) 425). Any compromise or adjustment of the cause of
action by the original parties, made after notice of the assignment
but without consent of the assignee, will be void against him
(Dunn v. Snell (1819) 15 Mass. 481). An accord and satisfaction
entered into and carried out between the assignor and the debtor
who has had notice will be invalid as against the assignee (Jenkins
v. Brewster (1817) 14 Mass. 291). Neither attachment nor
garnishment by creditors of the assignor can defeat the rights of
the assignee after the debtor has learned of the transfer of the
chose in action. If the assignee has only a qualified interest in the
chose, the debtor may deal with the assignor after notice, but he
deals subject to the interest of the assignee and is liable to the
assignee only to the extent of that interest (Sanders v. Soutter,
136 N. Y. 97).
The notice to the debtor need not be in any particular form.
An assignment will bind him if he has such knowledge of facts and
circumstances as ought to put him on inquiry. No special notice
is necessary nor need the assignee exhibit to the debtor the instru
ment itself or any other evidence. However, in Skobis v. Ferge,
102 Wis. 122, Justice Dodge says:
The notice to him (the debtor), therefore, must be of so exact
and specific a character as to convince him that he is no
longer liable to such original creditor, and to place in his
hands the means of defense against him, or at least the in
formation necessary to interplead the assignee.

Acceptance of the notice by the debtor is not essential to its
validity (Kingman v. Perkins (1870) 105 Mass. 1ll) because the
assent of the debtor is unnecessary to complete the assignment.
The determination of the rights of assignees where the assignor
makes a second assignment of the same chose in action has caused
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the courts considerable trouble. In the leading English case on the
subject, Dearl v. Hall (1823, Ch.) 3 Russ 1, the court established
the rule that a subsequent assignee of a cestui’s interest who in
quired of the trustee and gave notice of his assignment would be
given precedence over a prior assignee who did not give such notice.
This principle was approved by the house of lords in Foster v.
Cockerell (1835, H. L.) 3 C1. & F. 456. The rule was later broad
ened to such an extent that it now includes all choses in action.
The court, in Meaux v. Bell (1841, Ch.) 1 Hare 73, said:
The omission of the puisne encumbrancer to make inquiry
can not be material where inquiry of the circumstances of
the case would not have led to a knowledge of the prior en
cumbrance.

This statement has been interpreted to mean that inquiry of the
debtor by the subsequent assignee was not required, with the
result that since 1841 the subsequent assignee could fix his rights
without inquiry if he gave the necessary notice. An excellent
present-day statement of the English rule is given by Justice
Lawlor in Adamson v. Paonessa (1919) 180 Cal. 157 where he
quotes the court in Widenmann v. Weiniger, 164 Cal. 667 as
follows:
As between successive assignees of a chose in action, he will
have a preference who first gives notice to the debtor, even
if he be a subsequent assignee, providing at the time of taking
it he had no notice of the prior assignment.
The basis for the English rule seems to be that the negligence of
the prior assignee in failing to notify the debtor of his assignment
should estop him from asserting any claim that would jeopardize
the interest of the subsequent assignee who has paid full value for
the chose in action and who has no way of learning of the prior as
signment. This is an application of the principle of estoppel and
of the old rule of equity, that of two innocent parties, one of whom
must suffer, he whose act or omission caused the loss must bear it.
Later courts adopting this rule have justified their action on the
ground that it was the only way to protect against the fraud of
the assignor (Jenkinson v. New York Finance Company (1911) 79
N. J. Eq. 247).
There are some circumstances in which the English rule does not
apply. The second assignee may not recover unless he has given
consideration to the assignor for the assignment. A gratuitous
assignment of a chose in action or one given in consideration of an
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antecedent debt is not sufficient, according to the court in Davis v.
State National Bank (1913) 156 S. W. 321, although there has been
at least one decision to the contrary in which a creditor assignee
was considered to be in the same secure position as an assignee for
value (In re Furnace Company (1916) 233 Fed. 451). The court,
in Laclede Bank v. Schuler (1887) 120 U. S. 511, decided that an
assignee in bankruptcy would be given the same protection by law
as an assignee for value. In Third National Bank v. Atlantic City
(1903) 126 Fed. 413, the prior assignee was permitted to prevail
over the attaching creditor of a subsequent assignee who had
given first notice of the assignment. Notice of the prior assign
ment will defeat the rights of the subsequent assignee (Powell v.
Powell (1909) 217 Mo. 571). There is some conflict of authority
as to who has the burden of proof in respect to the notice. In
Wagenhurst v. Wineland (1902) 20 App. D. C. 85, the court ruled
that the subsequent assignee should be responsible but it was
decided in Peters v. Goetz (1916) 136 Tenn. 257, that the prior
assignee must prove the notice in order to defeat the later assignee.
The American rule is that between equal equities the prior
assignee takes good title to the chose in action. The subsequent
assignee gets nothing, because the assignor transferred all his right
to the chose to the first assignee and consequently he had nothing
which he could assign to the second assignee. Notice to the
debtor by the subsequent assignee can not affect the title of the
prior assignee because the latter already has the right to the chose
in action. Although no notice to the debtor is necessary as be
tween assignee and assignor (Quigley v. Welter (1905) 95 Minn. 383)
if notice of the assignment is not given the debtor may discharge
his liability by paying the subsequent assignee or the assignor
(Commonwealth v. Sides (1896) 176 Pa. 616). If the debtor pays
the debt to the subsequent assignee or to the assignor without
notice of the assignment it is only just that he be protected against
the prior assignee since it is through the silence of the latter that
the debtor has made the payment to the wrong party. Should
the last assignee receive payment when estoppel is not present he
holds the funds as trustee for the first assignee (Rabinowitz v.
Peoples National Bank (1920) 235 Mass. 102).
If the second assignee is clever or swift enough to obtain pay
ment from the debtor he will be able to defeat the claims of the
prior assignee (Rabinowitz v. Peoples National Bank (1920) 235
Mass. 102). When the last assignee makes a novation with the
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debtor his claim to the chose in action is better than that of the
earlier assignee according to the court in New York, New Haven &
H. R. R. v. Schuyler (1865) 34 N. Y. 30. If the last assignee sues
the debtor and reduces his claim to a judgment he will be per
mitted by the courts to prevail over the prior assignee (Judson v.
Corcoran (1854, U. S.) 17 How. 612). In this case, a second as
signee of a claim against the Mexican government, who gave imme
diate notice of his assignment to the secretary of state, prosecuted
his claim before the commissioners and obtained an award. The
court held that the subsequent assignee had a better title than the
prior assignee who gave no notice of his assignment and made no
effort to enforce his claim until after the award had been made.
That the first assignee may act in such a manner as to estop him
from denying that the last assignee has priority was decided in
Security Company v. Delfs (1920) 47 Cal. App. 599. If he permits
the assignor to retain possession of the evidence of the chose, thus
enabling the latter to dispose of it to a bona-fide assignee for value
or by his laches he stands by and permits a subsequent assignee to
recover on the chose in action there is excellent authority which
denies him a claim to the property involved.
Neither the English nor the American rule applies where the
assignor and the debtor specify the method of assignment. That
assignee has the best claim with whom the assignor made the
assignment according to the provisions of the contract with the
debtor, irrespective of whether he is the prior assignee or the sub
sequent assignee (Fortunato v. Patten (1895) 147 N. Y. 277). If
the assignment is made with power of revocation, a subsequent
assignment of the same chose in action will revoke the first assign
ment, according to the court in McCormick v. Sadler, 14 Utah 463.
If the statutes of a jurisdiction require the recordation of this type
of assignment, the assignee who fails to record will have no priority
over another assignee, prior or subsequent, who obeys the law and
places his assignment on the public records (Peabody v. Lewiston
(1891) 83 Me. 286).
There seems to be an irreconcilable conflict among the American
decisions in respect to the status of the assignees where there have
been subsequent assignments. The federal courts and those of
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Iowa, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Canada follow the English rule while the American rule is
followed by the courts of Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Ken
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tucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Hamp
shire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, West
Virginia, and Washington. The supreme court of the United
States in early times seemed to favor the English rule. In Spain
v. Hamilton's Administrator (1863) 1 Wall (U. S.) 604 the court
stated the following rather strong dictum:
As the assignee is generally entitled to all the remedies of the
assignor so he is subject to all the equities between the as
signor and his debtor. But in order to perfect his title against
the debtor, it is indispensable that the assignee should im
mediately give notice of the assignment to the debtor, for
otherwise a priority of right may be obtained by a subse
quent assignee, or the debt may be discharged by a payment
to the assignee before such notice.

Since this dictum was not law the position of our highest court was
uncertain until 1924 when the English rule was rejected and the
American rule was adopted in Salem Trust Company v. Manufac
turers' Finance Company (1924) 44 Sup. Ct. 266. In this case the
Nelson Company assigned to the petitioner for value a debt
amounting to $45,000 due it under a contract and later the assignor
assigned the same debt to the defendant who failed to inquire
of the debtor regarding previous assignments and had no notice of
the prior assignment to the petitioner. The defendant notified
the debtor of the assignment before the petitioner. Later the
Nelson Company became bankrupt, and the supreme court held
that as between the petitioner and the defendant, the one whose
assignment was prior in time should prevail.
Some of the early writers justified the English rule on the ground
of an analogy to the sale of a chattel to a later vendee by a vendor
who had been allowed to remain in possession in which case the
first vendee is not permitted to assert his title against that of the
second assignee because he allowed the vendor to retain the indicia
of ownership. This reasoning is not now applicable in the states
which have adopted the uniform-sales act because section 25 of
that act provides that a second assignee who relies on the reten
tion of possession by the vendor and who purchases for value and
obtains delivery is protected. Consequently, the second vendee
does not need the protection of the common law. Others main
tain that the prior assignee knows that he has the opportunity to
protect himself against subsequent assignments by notifying the
debtor of the assignment and if he is so negligent that he fails to
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take this precaution his claim should not take precedence over
that of a subsequent assignee for value without notice.
The American rule seems more reasonable because the assignor
transfers all his interest in the chose in action to the first assignee
and he should not be permitted to accept value from a second
assignee for the assignment of a right which he no longer possesses.
To hold otherwise would encourage fraud on the part of the as
signor. According to the court in Columbia Finance Company
v. First Natonal Bank (1903) 116 Ky. 364:
The rule of caveat emptor applies to sales of choses in action
as in other sales of personal property, and if the seller has
sold the thing to one person, and therefore has no title to pass
to a second, the latter takes nothing by his purchase.

At common law partial assignments of choses in action may not
be enforced against the debtor without his consent to the division
of the debt. In the leading case, Mandeville v. Welch (1820) 5
Wheat. 277, Justice Story said:
A creditor shall not be permitted to split up a single cause of
action into many actions, without the consent of his debtor,
since it may subject him to many embarrassments and re
sponsibilities not contemplated in his original contract. He
has a right to stand upon the singleness of his original con
tract, and to decline any legal or equitable assignments, by
which it may be broken into fragments. When he under
takes to pay an integral sum to his creditor, it is no part of
his contract, that he should be obliged to pay in fractions to
any other person.
Further reasons for the rule are given by Justice Field in James v.
Newton (1886) 142 Mass. 366 where this learned jurist said:
It is not wholly a question of procedure, although the com
mon law procedure is not adapted to determining the rights
of different claimants to parts of a fund or debt. The rule
has been established, partially at least, on the ground of the
entirety of the contract, because it is held that a creditor
can not sue his debtor for a part of an entire debt, and, if he
bring such an action and recover judgment, the judgment is
a bar to an action to recover the remaining amount. There
must be distinct promises in order to maintain more than
one action.

It is only reasonable that the courts should not permit a creditor
to divide an obligation to pay him a stated sum into parts, and
assign them to several parties, thereby subjecting his debtor to
the trouble of having more than one claim presented to him or of
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defending more than one suit arising out of the original contract.
The law requires the debtor to comply with his contract but it
requires no more than this. However, where the debtor consents
to an assignment of part of his debt, the assignee may sue him on
this part {Richmond v. Parker, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 48). The right
to recognize partial assignments of choses in action is personal to
the debtor and may not be insisted upon by a third party who has
sued him (Burditt v. Porter (1891) 63 Vt. 296). Where the code
provides that actions may be brought by the real parties in inter
est, the assignor of a partial assignment of a chose in action may
join the assignee in an action to enforce payment by the debtor
(Singleton v. O'Blemis, 125 Ind. 151).
The main reason for not enforcing a partial assignment of a
chose in action at common law does not exist in equity because all
the parties at interest may be brought before the court and their
rights under the original contract and the assignment or assign
ments can be settled in one decree so the debtor will not be an
noyed or inconvenienced by more than one suit on his contract.
Courts of equity have always recognized partial assignments of
choses in action for many purposes and will protect the assignee,
after notice to the debtor, if it is possible to do so without inflict
ing a hardship upon the latter {Richardson v. White (1896) 167
Mass. 58). The theory of equity seems to be that the debtor owes
part to the assignee and part to the assignor. According to Jus
tice Field in James v. Newton (1886) 142 Mass. 366:

It is said that in equity, there may be, without the consent
of the debtor, an assignment of part of an entire debt. It
is conceded that, as between assignor and assignee, there may
be such an assignment. ... In many jurisdictions, courts
of equity have gone still further, and have held that an assign
ment of a part of a fund or debt may be enforced in equity by
a bill brought by the assignee against the debtor and the assignor while the debt remains unpaid. . . . But some courts
of equity have gone still further, and have held that after
notice of a partial assignment of a debt, the debtor can not
rightfully pay the sum assigned to his creditor, and, if he
does, that is no defense to a bill by the assignee. The doc
trine carried to this extent effects a substantial change in the
law. Under the old rule, the debtor could with safety settle
with his creditor and pay him, unless he had notice or knowl
edge of an assignment of the whole of the debt; under this
rule, he can not, if he have notice or knowledge of an assign
ment of any part of it.
347

The Journal of Accountancy

The equity courts will not force the debtor to pay the claim
piecemeal. He may insist upon making a single payment unless
his contract with his creditor provides otherwise. If he objects
to paying fractional parts of his indebtedness he may pay the
whole sum into a court of equity to be distributed by it among the
parties entitled to the fund. But if he is unable to pay the entire
indebtedness upon a single decree of the court, he may refuse to
recognize the partial assignment and nullify the act of the assignor
(Wilson v. Carson (1857) 12 Md. 54).
By the fact of assignment for a consideration, the assignor
guarantees that he will not interfere with the chose in action there
after. Furthermore, he creates an implied covenant that he has
done and will do nothing to prevent the assignee from collecting it
(Eaton v. Mellus (1856) 7 Gray (Mass.) 566). Justice Story, in
Mandeville v. Welch (1820) 5 Wheat. 277, said:

It has long since been settled, that where a chose in action is
assigned by the owner, he shall not be permitted fraudulently
to interfere and defeat the rights of the assignee in the pros
ecution of any suit to enforce those rights. And it has not
been deemed to make any difference, whether the assignment
be good at law, or in equity only.
If the assignor does interfere and damage results to the assignee,
he renders himself liable to the latter (Sanders v. Aldrich, 25 Barb.
(N. Y.) 63).
In every chose assignment there is an implied warranty on the
part of the assignor that the chose in action is a genuine and real
claim in his favor against the debtor (Tyler v. Bailey, 71 Ill. 34).
Should the claim be invalid, the warranty is broken as soon as it is
made, and the assignee may immediately sue the assignor and he
need not return the assigned chose (Flynn v. Allen, 57 Pa. St. 482).
If he sues to collect and fails, he is entitled to recover from the
assignor what he paid for the assignment and his reasonable ex
penses in such suit (Phoenix Insurance Company v. Parsons (1891)
129 N. Y. 86) but if he does not bring an action he is entitled to the
amount he paid for the chose (Barley v. Layman, 79 Va. 518).
The assignee may seek the return of the consideration paid before
commencing suit if he so desires (Walsh v. Rogers, 15 Nebr. 309)
but he must give the assignor notice of any defense set up against
the assigned chose (Drayton v. Thompson, 1 Bay (S. C.) 263).
It seems to the writer that the courts show by their decisions in
cases involving chose in action assignments that they appreciate
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the importance to business of liberal laws in respect to the transfer
of claims from one party to another. Since transfers of this na
ture are apparently to occupy a place of more significance in the
future than they have in the past, such an attitude on the part of
our jurists will prove helpful to business in general.
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